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I. THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE, 1946-BACKGROUND
A S a consequence of the failure of the British and American repre-
sentatives to come to a complete economic agreement during the
Chicago Conference, late in 1944, an inter-governmental conference of
the two powers met in Bermuda in January, 1946, and concluded the
Agreement relating to Air Services between the United Kingdom and
the United States of America, signed on February 11 th, 1946.
The principles expressed in the Resolution of the Final Act of the
Bermuda Conference are well known and it is not within the scope of
this article to explore them further than is necessary to show their effect
on rates. It was agreed "that the two Governments desire to foster and
encourage the widest possible distribution of the benefits of air travel for
the general good of mankind at the cheapest rates consistent with sound
economic principles" (Emphasis supplied throughout) and "that there
shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the carriers of the two nations
to operate on any route between their respective territories."
These principles were developed further in Annex II of the Ber-
muda Agreement I which declares that rates shall be fixed at reasonable
levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as cost of oper-
ation, reasonable profit and the rates charged by any other air carriers.
The Bermuda Agreement was a compromise between the British
and American views but, since this is the first time in any air transport
agreement that an undertaking regarding rates appears, it represents
great progress in the development of international rate making.
Annex II of the Bermuda Agreement can be considered as a set of
rules to safeguard the principles expressed in the Final Act of the Ber-
muda Conference, and as a guaranty of reasonable rate control over
international air carriers, the stipulation that "all rates to be charged
* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not nec-
essarily represent the official point of view of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA).
1 ,, (h) The rates to be agreed in accordance with the above paragraphs shall
be fixed at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as
cost of operation, reasonable profit and the rates charged by other air carriers."
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of the United States of America, relating to Air Services between their respective
territories, Bermuda, 11 February, 1946 (Bermuda Agreement), Annex II, ff(h).
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. . . shall be subject to the approval of the Contracting Parties within
their respective Constitutional powers and obligations" 2 expressly re-
serves the right to each contracting party to disapprove any rate pro-
posed by the other's carriers. Thus the control over any operation
between the respective territories is finally exercised by the contracting
states.
APPLICATION OF THE RATE PROVISIONS
It is provided in Annex II, Para. (a), of the Bermuda Agreement
that the respective regulations concern only rates to be charged between
points in the territory of the United States and points in the territory of
the United Kingdom. Thus, it appears that the contracting parties re-
stricted themselves to some extent and, purposely or not, failed to apply
the rate provision between points outside their respective territories.
If the structure of rate regulations in the Annex is to be looked at from
this rather narrow point of view, the question arises as to what law and
regulation are effective in respect of rates of flights which:
(a) originate in points in a third country,
(b) terminate in points of a third country,
(c) originate in country A, fly through one or both of the con-
tracting parties' territories and terminate in country B.
Difficulties are bound to arise and, when one of the contracting par-
ties disputes a through rate, there appears to be no procedure in the
Agreement for remedial action. Thus, there has recently arisen a situa-
tion in which an American carrier filed a competitive rate from London
to Sydney via New York which was protested by British and Australian
operators providing service between the same two points, but via the
Middle East. While there was much comment, there appears to be lit-
tle opportunity for redress under the terms of either the Bermuda
Agreement or the United States-Australian Agreement. Admittedly
the route originates in London, under the terms of the Bermuda Agree-
ment, and terminates in Sydney under the United States agreement
with Australia, but neither agreement covers the through rate for the
whole route. In the same way, British and Australian companies could,
if they wished, offer a competitive fare to Americans from the East
Coast of the United States to Sydney, via London. Under the present
regime, the situation is such that no single Traffic Conference of the
International Air Transport Association can dispose of it; agreement
on a through rate of this kind must be reached through composite meet-
ings of all three IATA Traffic Conferences.
2 " (a) Rates to be charged by the air carriers of either Contracting Party be-
tween points in the territory of the United States and points in the territory of
the United Kingdom referred to in this Annex shall be subject to the approval of
the Contracting Parties within their respective constitutional powers and obliga-
tion. In the event of disagreement, the matter in dispute shall be handled as pro-
vided below." Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, 1 (a).
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APPROVAL OF THE CONFERENCE MACHINERY BY THE CAB
In Annex II, Para. (b) of the Bermuda Agreement,3 it is declared
that:
(1) the CAB of the United States had announced its intention to
approve the IATA rate conference machinery for one year,
and
(2) any rate agreements concluded through this machinery dur-
ing that period would be subject to Board approval if they in-
volved American-flag operators.
Approval of the IATA conference machinery by the United States
came as a result of lengthy consideration. Under general American
law, a carrier participating in an agreement to fix rates, frequencies or
capacities would be subject to possible prosecution under the antitrust
statutes. Nevertheless, the conference method of rate-making received
favorable recognition in the Shipping Act of 1916,.which contains pro-
visions 4 indicating that Congress foresaw use of this device and making
such agreements subject to the approval of what is now the Maritime
Commission. It has also been accepted by Shippers, Regulatory Com-
missions and Carriers in Rail Transport.
Similarly, while no specific procedure for reaching rate agreement is
mentioned in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Sec. 412 requires that
agreements between air carriers be filed with the Board and Sec. 412
(b) I makes them subject to CAB approval. If the Board does not find
an agreement entered into by a U.S. airline against the public interest,
3 "(b) The Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States having announced
its intention to approve the rate conference machinery of the International Air
Transport Association (hereinafter called IATA), as submitted, for a period of
one year beginning in February, 1946, any rate agreements concluded through this
machinery during this period and involving United States air carriers will be sub-
ject to approval by the Board." Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, ff (b).
4 "Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter,
shall file immediately with the commission a true copy ... of every agreement,
with another such carrier or other person subject to this chapter ... fixing or reg-
ulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommo-
dations, or other special privileges, or advantages; ... or in any manner providing
for an exclusive preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term
'agreement' in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other
arrangements." 39 Stat. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (1944).
5 "The Authority shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public
interest, or in violation of this Act, and shall by order approve any such contract
or agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to
be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this Act; except that the
Authority may not approve any contract or agreement between an air carrier not
directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air transportation and a common
carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, governing the com-
pensation to be received by such common carrier for transportation services per-
formed by it." (As amended by Act of May 16, 1942, 56 Stat. 301.)
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approval follows and carrier is relieved from operation of antitrust laws
by Sec. 414 6 of the Act of 1938.
CAB CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL RATES
That Act empowered the Board to determine fair and reasonable
rates of pay for flying the mail,' fix different rates for different air car-
riers and different classes of service," and to remove discriminatory,
preferential or prejudicial rates.9 It must be noted, however, that the
CAB has no direct control over rates of U.S. carriers operating interna-
tionally,10 although it has requested amendment of the Act to secure
such power."
It is provided in Sec. 1002 (d) that the Board may prescribe only a
just and reasonable maximum and/or minimum rate, fare or charge for
6 An i mportant pronouncement of Congressional policy in such matters is
incorporated in Section 414 of the Civil Aeronautics Act:
"Any person affected by any order made under Sections 408, 409 or 412
of this Act shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the 'anti-
trust laws,' as designated in Section 1 of the Act entitled 'An Act to supple-
ment existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other
purposes,' approved October 15, 1914, and of all other restraints or prohibi-
tions made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be neces-
sary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required
by such order."
7 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, §401.
8 "(b) In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation
under this section, the Authority, considering the conditions peculiar to transpor-
tation by aircraft and to the particular air carrier or class of air carriers, may fix
different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers and different
classes of service. In determining the rate in each case, the Authority shall take
into consideration, among other factors, the condition that such air carriers may
hold and operate under certificates authorizing the carriage of mail only by pro-
viding necessary and adequate facilities and service for the transportation of
mail; such standards respecting the character and quality of service to be ren-
dered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law; and the need of
each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to
insure the performance of such service, and together with all other revenue of the
air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical and efficient man-
agement, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the
extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United
States, the Postal Service, and the national defense." §406(b).
9 " (f) Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon its own
initiative, the Authority shall be of the opinion that any individual or joint rate,
fare, or charge demanded, charged, collected, or received by any air carrier or for-
eign air carrier for foreign air transportation, or fare, or charge or the value of
the service thereunder, is or will be unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferen-
tial, or unduly prejudicial, the Authority may alter the same to the extent neces-
sary to correct such discrimination, preference or prejudice and make an order
that the air carrier or foreign air carrier shall discontinue demanding, charging,
collecting, or receiving any such discriminatory, preferential, or prejudicial rate,
fare or charge, or enforcing any such discriminatory, preferential, or prejudicial
classification, rule, regulation or practice." §1002 (F).
10 It is quite obvious that the control of rates in foreign air transportation
was excluded from the scope of power of the CAB and that is further evidenced in
Section 404(c) :
"The Authority is empowered and directed to investigate and report to
the Congress within one year from the effective date of this section, to what
extent, if any, the Federal Government should further regulate the rates,
fares, and charges of air carriers engaged in foreign air transportation, and
the classifications, rules, regulations, and practices affecting such rates,
fares, or charges."
11 See 1948 Annual Report of CAB, 13, and 1947 Report 12 as well as 1946
Report 12 for some examples. See H.R. 2911 and §12 (a) of S. 237 introduced by
Representative Kennedy and Senator Johnson respectively, in the 81st Congress,
Ist Sess.; to implement the request.
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overseas air transportation by American operators. The only substan-
tial power that the Board possesses over the rates of the United States
international carriers is when the United States air carriers enter into
rate agreements with each other or with foreign air carriers. Under
such circumstances, "the Board may approve or disapprove the rates
embodied in such agreements." . Thus, because rates became the sub-
ject of the agreements, the Board indirectly acquired more power over
United States international carriers than had been conferred directly by
the Act. It should be emphasized, however, that this control over inter-
national rate agreements is still not as great as that possessed over
domestic transportation where the power to fix rates is specifically
granted.
The Civil Aeronautics Act has been interpreted in different ways.
The official point of view on competition is expressed in the following
opinion of the Board:
"The competition contemplated by the Civil Aeronautics Act
is not the unlimited and uncontrolled competition which permits
destructive rates having no relation to the cost of operation but
having the power to provoke subsidy wars among nations. The
Civil Aeronautics Act as construed by this Board regulated com-
petition which seeks to avoid the stifling influence of monopoly on
the one hand and the economic anarchism of unrestrained compe-
tition on the other."'12
The conception incorporated in the above-quoted opinion is inher-
ent in the Board's opinion approving the Traffic Conference machinery
of IATA:
"We cannot accept without proof the proposition that the pres-
ent resolution, which establishes the only presently available ma-
chinery whereby the United States Government through this Board
can share and have a voice in the regulation of the rates of our
international air carriers, is inconsistent with that policy of con-
trolled competition which the Civil Aeronautics Act contemplates.
How are we disposed to declare without proof that the full benefits
of competition, including the gearing of rates in international air
transportation to the costs of the most efficient operator, will be re-
alized under the procedure of consultation and agreement between
the international air carriers? We refrain, therefore, from pre-
judging on this ground a proposal that is both assailed and sup-
ported by only theoretical considerations."' l
This position was reaffirmed by the Board in 1947 and in 1948,
when the Board again found that participation by American flag car-
riers in the JATA Traffic Conferences would not be against the public
interest or in violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act, thereby continuing
its temporary approval which commenced in February, 1946, and termi-
12 IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, Agreement CAB No. 493 (Ser. 4525,
Feb. 19, 1946), p. 9.
13 Agreement CAB No. 493 (Ser. 4525, Feb. 19, 1946), p. 9, 10.
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nated in February, 1947, to February, 1948 14 and later to February 28,
1950.15
The requirement incorporated in Paragraph (b), Annex II of the
Bermuda Agreement that agreements concluded through IATA Traffic
Conference machinery need to be approved by the CAB is of great
importance. Its purpose is to extend the power of the CAB over the
international operations of United States carriers.
There is a further effect of the Board's reservation to approve or dis-
approve the agreements reached by the American carriers through the
IATA Conference machinery. It reserves the right to the U.S. Govern-
ment to exercise' a final control over the participation of its carriers in
an international body, without which this latter could validly bind the
U.S. carrier, and consequently affect indirectly the U.S. public without
any check or balance. It seems that this proviso aims at conferring
upon the CAB a control similar to that possessed by other foreign gov-
ernments' aeronautical agencies.
The international importance of the question lies in the belief that
the government, by having control over the rates of its own carriers,
will prevent uneconomic rate-cutting and thus avoid international con-
flicts.
There is no approval of IATA Conference machinery expressed by
British authorities because there is no need for such approval, the
United Kingdom not having legislation similar to Section .412 (b) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act; nor has the United Kingdom antitrust laws,
necessitating a previous approval of the machinery which provides
means for rate agreements. However, as previously mentioned, in Par-
agraph (a), Annex II, of the Bermuda Agreement, it is provided that
rates are subject to government approval.
British carriers can participate in conferences without breach of any
domestic law. This consideration throws some light on why British
authorities found participation in the IATA Traffic Conferences one
solution to the problem of unlimited competition; they held the view
that the different national carriers, in participating in this machinery
would exercise the best control over those efforts which were aimed at
the elimination of uneconomic rate-cutting.
To sum up, the United States Delegation entered into the Bermuda
conversations at a disadvantage. The Government of the United King-
dom had full authority to regulate the rates of its own flag carriers leav-
ing the United Kingdom for other countries and the rates of the
carriers of other flags entering the United Kingdom. But the United
States Government had direct authority over the rates of foreign car-
riers coming into the United States. Except by indirect methods, it
could not influence the rates which American international carriers
charged.
14 Agreement CAB No. 493 (Ser. E-269, Jan. 31, 1947).
15 Agreement CAB No. 493 as revised by Agreement CAB No. 1175 (Ser.
E-1227, Feb. 20, 1948).
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Thus, when the two governments stated in the Bermuda Agreement
that they had the right to approve or disapprove the rates charged by
the carriers, this expression actually affected only the United States.
The peculiar character of American legislation had put the Civil
Aeronautics Board deliberately in a position where the only way it
could have any real check on the rates charged by its own airlines was
through its power to approve agreements between carriers, who were, as
a result, exempted from the operation of the antitrust laws. It might
be of some interest to note that in connection with the power conferred
upon the Board in Section 404 (c) of the Act, the Board in 1939 recom-
mended against control of rates in foreign air transportation. It now
favors control.' 6
Without this power, and without the Traffic Conference as machin-
ery, the Board would have less direct authority over the rate policies, of
an American flag carrier than any one of a large number of foreign gov-
ernments.
SUBSTITUTION FOR IATA TRAFFIC CONFERENCE
The Bermuda Agreement foresaw certain circumstances, 17 where, if
no IATA Conference machinery were available, a rate agreement was
not approved within a reasonable time by either contracting party, or,
finally, if either contracting party withdrew or failed to renew its ap-
proval of that part of the Conference machinery relevant to the provi-
sion, it would be necessary for the contracting parties to use a substitute
procedure described in Paras. (e) and (f) of Annex II of the Agree-
16 See note 11, supra.
17 "(d) The Contracting Parties hereby agree that where-
(1) during the period of the Board's approval of the IATA rate confer-
ence machinery, either any specific rate agreement is not approved
within a reasonable time by either Contracting Party, or a confer-
ence of IATA is unable to agree on a rate, or
(2) at any time no IATA machinery is applicable, or
(3) either Contracting Party at any time withdrawn or fails to renew its
approval of that part of the IATA rate conference machinery rele-
vant to this -provision,
the procedure described in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) hereof shall apply.
"(e) In the event that power is conferred by law upon the aeronautical
authorities of the United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of
persons and property by air on international services, and to suspend proposed
rates in a manner comparable to that in which the Civil Aeronautics Board at
present is empowered to act with respect to such rates for the transport of per-
sons and property by air within the United States, each of the Contracting Parties
shall thereafter exercise its authority in such manner as to prevent any rate or
rates proposed by one of its carriers for services from the territory of one Con-
tracting Party to a point or points in the territory of the other Contracting Party
from becoming effective, if in the judgment of the aeronautical authorities of the
Contracting Party whose air carrier or carriers is or are proposing such rate, that
rate is unfair or uneconomic. If one of the Contracting Parties on receipt of the
notification referred to in paragraph (c) above is dissatisfied with the new rate
proposed by the air carrier or carriers of the other Contracting Party, it shall so
notify the other Contracting Party prior to the expiry of the first fifteen of the
thirty days referred to, and the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reach
agreement on the appropriate rate. In the event that such agreement is reached,
each Contracting Party will exercise its statutory powers to give effect to such
agreement. If agreement has not been reached at the end of the thirty-day period
referred to in paragraph (c) above, the proposed rate may, unless the aeronauti-
cal authorities of the country of the air carrier concerned see fit to suspend its
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ment. For the purpose of this substitute procedure two periods are dis-
tinguished, one before and the other after the Board has been given the
power, by law, to regulate international rates.
The first divergency between the two periods is, that while in the
second period it is agreed that each of the contracting parties, if in the
judgment of their Aeronautical Authorities a rate proposed by one of
its carriers is unfair or uneconomic, shall exercise its authority in such
manner as to prevent such rate from becoming effective.
The distinction between these two periods becomes significant if
one of the contracting parties is dissatisfied with the way in which the
other has exercised its control. In this case, if upon receipt of notifica-
tion (thirty days before the proposed date of introduction) one of the
contracting parties did not agree to the new rate proposed by the air
carrier of the other contracting party, it could so inform the other in a
given period (before the expiry of the first fifteen of the thirty days re-
ferred to above). Both contracting parties thereupon would try to
reach an appropriate rate agreement at a government level and if such
an agreement were reached, in the second period both would use their
statutory powers to make such agreement effective. In the first period,
however, the contracting parties, only agree that they "will use their
best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put into effect by its air car-
rier or carriers." Thus, because one of the contracting parties has no
statutory power over international rates, no reference is made to such
power.
The distinction between the two periods is still more important if
no agreement is reached by the government authorities at the end of
the thirty day period.
In the second period, the disputed rate may go into effect and the
only party who can prevent its operation is the government authority of'
the country of the air carrier concerned - the other government
authority has no veto right over the temporary introduction of a dis-
puted rate pending the settlement of the dispute. The position is com-
pletely reversed in the first period where the objecting party may pre-
vent the inauguration of the service in question.
operation, go into effect provisionally pending the settlement of any dispute in
accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (g) below.
"(f) Prior to the time when such power may be conferred by law upon the
aeronautical authorities of the United States, if one of the Contracting Parties is
dissatisfied with any new rate proposed by the air carrier or carriers of either
Contracting Party for services from the territory of one Contracting Party to a
point or points in the territory of the other Contracting Party, it shall so notify
the other prior to the expiry of the first fifteen of the thirty-day period referred
to in paragraph (c) above, and the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reach
agreement on the appropriate rate. In the event that such agreement is reached,
each Contracting Party will use its best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put
into effect by its air carrier or carriers. It is recognized that if no such agree-
ment can be reached prior to the expiry of such thirty days, the Contracting Party
raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary
to prevent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the rate
complained of." Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, (d), (e) and (f).
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Thus, in the second case, the party who raised the objection is
obliged to permit the provisional operation of the contested rate,
whereas in the first case, he may bar the operation of the disputed serv-
ice.
This distinction already appears not to be negligible but the empha-
sis in the last paragraph of Annex II 18 on the promise of the Executive
Branch of the Government of the United States "to use its best efforts
to secure legislation empowering the aeronautical authorities of the
United States" to fix rates relating to international transport compar-
able to that manner in which the Board at present is empowered to act
with respect to domestic transportation is the best proof that effective
government control of international civil aviation was desired, not only
by the United States authorities, but as well by the United Kingdom
authorities. Both the U.S. and British Governments were anxious to
have the CAB acquire effective control over the international opera-
tions of American flag carriers.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
In case the parties fail to reach agreement 19 through direct consul-
t ration upon the request of either, both agree to submit the question for
an advisory report to PICAO, or its successor, ICAO, and to use their
best efforts under the powers available to them to put into effect the
opinion expressed. "Advisory report" seems a rather cautious expres-
sion of the final result of an international settlement but as no precedent
has been created its interpretation cannot be given with any certainty.
This stand of the parties regarding disagreements is of great impor-
tance. It reflects the serious differences in concept which existed be-
tween some of the European countries and the United States in the
Chicago Conference of 1944. The United States, at that stage, was not
prepared to accept the economic rule of an international tribunal. In
the Bermuda Agreement, however, it appears that some concession was
made toward acceptance of authority of an international agency. The
articles regulating disputes in the later bilateral agreements show
whether or not the United States' point of view has advanced further
and how the British concept developed.
Is " (j) The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States agrees
to use its best efforts to secure legislation empowering the aeronautical authorities
of the United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of persons
and property by air on international services, and to suspend proposed rates in a
manner comparable to that in which the Civil Aeronautics Board at present is em-
powered to act with respect to such rates for the transport of persons and prop-
erty by air within the United States." Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, (j).
19 "(g) When in any case under paragraphs (e) and (f) above the aeronauti-
cal authorities of the two Contracting Parties cannot agree within a reasonable
time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one
Contracting Party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the air car-
rier or carriers of the other Contracting Party, upon the request of either, both
Contracting Parties shall submit the question to the Provisional International
Civil Aviation Organization, or to its successor for an advisory report, and each
party will use its best efforts under the powers available to it to put into effect the
opinion expressed in such report." Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, (g).
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The problems involved 20 are as follows:
(1) the nature of the tribunal,
(2) the authority and type of decision of the tribunal, and
(3) temporary remedies and sanctions.
A detailed analysis of various methods of handling disputes is hardly
necessary here. As a practical matter, it is apparent that the machinery
now used to reach rate agreements has successfully fulfilled the expecta-
tions of the nations which have expressly or implicitly approved it.
Those disputes which have occurred have been localized. The process
of hammering out an agreement to raise or lower a rate has been con-
fined to the Conferences, where the individual interests of the carriers
and, indirectly of their governments, can be safeguarded without re-
course to open economic warfare.
The successful operation of the Conferences has been recognized,
not only by the bilateral agreements negotiated since Bermuda, but also
by the text of the Draft Multilateral Agreement. Since the states who
would be parties to this agreement have already acknowledged and
adopted its principles in their bilaterals, adoption of the multilateral by
them should not be difficult.
The differences between the various concepts of settlement of rate
disputes has had no practical importance to date, but it might have seri-
ous effects upon the goodwill of states, particularly in the case of an
advisory report which could not be put into effect because of a lack of
"available domestic powers." The solution proposed in the Draft
Multilateral Agreement, however, seems sound and, if generally ac-
cepted, offers a restatement in international transportation of the prin-
ciple that every state is equally bound by its contracts ana that the
undertakings of the states are equally enforceable against all contract-
ing parties.
II. IATA TRAFFIC CONFERENCES
The bilateral agreements repeatedly recognize the existence and
authority, the machinery and recommendations of the Traffic Confer-
ences of IATA. These Conferences have frequently been the subject
of discussion, argument and criticism, but no substitute has yet been
offered that would be acceptable to all governments concerned.
Before the Bermuda Conference, three suggestions to end the unreg-
ulated rate situation were discussed. These were:
(1) to subject rates to the approval of an international aeronauti-
cal agency, on a governmental level;
(2) to fix every international rate by means of a bilateral agree-
ment (without creating an international agency);
20 The procedure adopted by the bilateral agreements for settling disputes is
duly summarized in "Bilateral Agreements-Chicago Type," ICAO Doc. AT.526
23/10/47, and elaborated by Ludwik Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, "Le i-eglement des
differends internationaux relatifs a la navigation aerienne civile." Revue Fran-
caise de Droit Aerien No. 4.
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(3) to fix rates by agreement among the carriers operating in a
given region.
The first suggestion was not new; it had been considered previously
at Chicago where the American representatives objected on the grounds
that there were, at that time, no set principles to serve as a guide for
such an international agency, and that the decisions of the agency
would be ineffective because they would not have the backing of law.
While there was no likelihood at Chicago that such an agency would
be established,, there was some discussion of how it might operate. It
was suggested that it could fix rates on the principle of the "costs of the
most efficient operator," but the general reaction seemed to be that it
would be improbable that such a governmental agency could determine
who the most efficient operator was and what its costs might be.
There were, it was pointed out., quite wide differences in standards
of living between countries. Some airlines were government enter-
prises, either in ownership or control, and might not be required to pay
taxes or to seek their capital in the open market. Airlines might also
be assisted by hidden subsidies and benefits, such as free use of airports,
radio aids and navigation facilities; government-financed training or
equipment purchase; and other cost reducing factors. In the domestic
field, these factors might be open to investigation by a national govern-
ment but before an international tribunal attempting to determine a
rate, they might well be closely guarded secrets whose withholding
could unduly influence the international rate structure.
In short, the powers which an international rate-making agency
would need in order to operate satisfactorily constituted a yielding of
national sovereignty to an extent which few nations were willing to
countenance.
In considering the suggestion that rates be determined at a govern-
ment level without the establishment of an "International Civil Aero-
nautics Board," it must be realized that rate-making on an international
level, even between two countries only, is a complicated matter. It is a
highly specialized function, which must be exercised by well-trained
specialists, and must take into consideration a great many conflicting
points of view, both national and international.
The conflict of these interests could be only solved through the
negotiation of further bilateral agreements with countries indirectly
interested in the rates on a given route. It is doubtful, however,
whether such a system could operate with the elasticity required in the
formulation of rate agreements. By the time a series of bilateral agree-
ments could be drawn up and agreed upon, the situation underlying
them might be completely changed, thus requiring new rate agree-
ments and a reopening of the entire procedure.
The third suggestion, to leave rates to agreement among carriers,
had practical advantages. The consideration that the operators are
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those who have the greatest experience in the rate-making field and
have the personnel required for the efficient handling of rate ques-
tions, led to the conclusion that the practical solution of the unsatis-
factory open rate situation was to let the carriers make their own agree-
ments through the already established IATA rate conference machin-
ery. This position was adopted in Bermuda and has been reaffirmed
since by the majority of the countries engaged in international air
transport operations.
In turning to the work of the Traffic Conferences, it should be kept
in mind that the principles established in the Bermuda Agreement
are those which govern the Conferences.
In order to appreciate fully the progress and machinery of the Con-
ferences, two general points should be kept in mind: first, the Traffic
Conferences have only been working for a few years and their pro-
cedures, rules and approach to problems are under constant develop-
ment. The aim to achieve better transportation at lower rates is
coupled with the endeavor to establish more efficient procedures and
to achieve these aims in the shortest possible time.
Second, it must be recognized that reasonable uniformity is an
important aid to more economical operation. The Traffic Conferences
have adopted this principle and their resolutions are to a great extent
influenced by it. The question of how far uniformity is reasonable is
rather arguable and only future experiences will prove whether the
limits adopted by the Conferences will be practical and what modifi-
cations, if any, may be necessary.
AREAS, REGULATIONS, AUTHORITY OF THE CONFERENCES
The machinery of the IATA Rate Conferences is set down in the
"Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Confer-
ences.
The world is divided into three Traffic Conference areas, which
may be described as follows:
Traffic Conference No. 1. Encompassing all of the North and South
American Continents and the islands adjacent thereto; Greenland;
Bermuda; the West Indies and islands of the Caribbean Sea; the
Hawaiian Islands (including Midway and Palmyra).
Traffic Conference No. 2. Covering all of Europe (including that part
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Europe) and the
islands adjacent thereto, Iceland; the Azores; all of Africa and the
islands adjacent thereto; Ascension Island; that part of Asia lying
west of and including Iran.
Traffic Conference No. 3. Including all of Asia and the islands adjacent
thereto except that portion included in Traffic Conference No. 2; all
.of the East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands adja-
cent thereto; the islands of the Pacific Ocean except those included
in Traffic Conference No. 1.
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In addition to rates, the Traffic Conferences are authorized to
consider and resolve all traffic matters involving passengers and cargo in
their respective areas. Every active member of IATA operating in the
territory of each Traffic Conference enjoys the right of a voting mem-
bership in that Conference. 21
The authority of the Conferences is derived from the IATA Gen-
eral Meeting and, according to their Provisions, the aims, objectives
and purposes of the Conferences are those of IATA: to promote safe,
regular and economic air transport, to provide means for collaboration
among the air transport enterprises; to foster air commerce and to study
the problems connected therewith; to cooperate with the International
Civil Aviation Organization and other international organizations.
A great part of the preliminary work of the Conferences is carried
out by their permanent Sub-Committees, of whom two should be men-
tioned here: The Costs Sub-Committee and the Fares, Rates and
Charges Sub-Committee.
The duties of the Sub-Committees are usually prescribed at the
time of their creation. Their recommendations are considered and
acted upon by the Traffic Conferences.
MEETINGS, VOTING
In connection with the formalities 'of the meetings of the Traffic
Conferences, at least thirty days' notice must be given before the date
fixed for the meeting, an Agenda must accompany this Notice of Call,
and all members have the right to request that matters be placed on
the Agenda.
The Traffic Conferences reach their final agreements through
voting, which is carried out by the accredited representatives of each
member. Regarding rates, action may be only taken upon the unani-
mous affirmative vote of the members represented at any meeting. The
failure of any member present at a meeting to vote is expressly deemed
to be ah affirmative vote.
This unanimous agreement appears to be a basic protection for all
members concerned and represents a serious guarantee to the govern-
ments whose airlines are members of Conferences. Individual Con-
ference members may take independent action, and other carriers can-
not bind a dissenting member by their eventual agreements. Perfect
21 1. Each Traffic Conference may consist of two classes of members, voting
and non-voting. Each active Member of IATA which operates scheduled commer-
cial international air transport services between two or more points within the
area of any Traffic Conference shall be a voting member of that Traffic Conference.
2. Each active Member of IATA which has scheduled commercial interna-
tional air transport operations between a single point within the area of one
Traffic Conference and one or more points in another Traffic Conference area shall
be qualified for voting membership in both of such Traffic Conferences and must
become a voting member of one of them.
3. Any Member of IATA may become a non-voting member of a Traffic Con-
ference in which it cannot qualify as a voting member upon its request to the Sec-
retary of such Traffic Conferences.
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protection against actions contrary to its interest is afforded the indi-
vidual carrier because:
(i) no matter can be acted upon unless it has been notified
to all members thirty days in advance of the meeting;
(ii) every member has the right to be represented at all
Conference meetings;
(iii) any individual Conference member can veto a resolu-
tion with which it disagrees.
There are detailed provisions incorporated in the regulations of the
Conferences for action by mail, for procedures to be followed at single
and joint Conference meetings, for presiding officers, and for voting
and non-voting membership. The amendment of these provisions has
been left to the Executive Committee of IATA, which has from time
to time approved changes to adapt Conferences to the needs of prac-
tical experience.
DISPUTES
It is difficult to determine what remedies are available to the car-
riers in the courts of various countries for a breach of agreement
reached at the Conferences. Certain countries would undoubtedly
uphold rate agreements, while others might not necessarily do so. It is,
therefore, evident that carriers have been compelled to attempt a sys-
tem of self-regulation to safeguard their agreements.
Every member of a Conference may stop Conference action by ex-
ercising its right to veto the agreement concerned, but if no such veto
is expressed each Conference member expects the others to comply with
the agreement. It is evident that a breach of a Conference agreement
.is not'an act of free competition, but an entry into unfair competitive
practice, against which other parties to the agreement must be reason-
ably protected. The machinery of the Conferences would be largely
ineffective if no protective regulations were incorporated. The discov-
ery and penalizing of breaches of Conference resolutions has a rather
lengthy history in shipping and rail transportation, but only the system
adopted by the IATA Conferences will be considered here.
According to the present Provisions, any member or members of a
Conference who believes that another member has violated a Confer-
ence agreement can demand the appointment of an investigatory com-
mission. This commission, acting under the authority of the IATA
Executive Committee, can settle its own procedure. Conference mem-
bers are required, upon the request of the commission, to furnish it
with any relevant information. The commission is then authorized to
reach a decision based upon the issues and evidence placed before it
and to impose upon any carrier found guilty of a breach of obligation
certain penalties prescribed by the Annual General Meeting of IATA.
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The carriers involved on either side of such a case have the right to
appeal a commission decision within sixty days to the IATA Executive
Committee. This group is given the final word in approving, disap-
proving, reducing or modifying the decision and penalty of the com-
mission. When a case has been finally determined, a full report of the
matter is to be circularized to all the members of the Conference
concerned.
Although there has been little need for this procedure since its
incorporation in the Provisions, its existence as a possible deterrent
to breaches of Conference resolutions has a practical value.
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR AFFECT ON RATE AGREEMENTS
There are at least two basic principles on which a rate structure
could be built:
(1) charging the highest rates that the traffic can bear;
(2) fixing rates in relation to reasonable cost and profit figures.
The first of these principles has been largely rejected in interna-
tional air transport practice. While the emergent need for transporta-
tion and communications in the years immediately following the war
made it possible for the airlines to increase their rates without losing
custom, they did not avail themselves of it. Instead, with the encour-
agement of states and of international organizations, the carriers have
concentrated upon improvements in efficiency and reductions in rates
to make air transport services available to the broadest possible market.
The effort to bring rates into relationship with costs has been a
process of continuous development. When the old North Atlantic
Traffic Conference held its first meeting in February, 1946, it was
found that no appropriate cost figures were available for rate-making
purposes. It was then necessary to develop a standard form for collect-
ing cost data, but the successful drafting of such a form was not in
itself enough to assure their availability. In some cases, some of this
data was considered as confidential from either a national or com-
mercial point of view, and special procedures for its confidential
disclosure and transmittal had to be developed. In others, the account-
ing procedures of the airlines themselves had to be expanded or
changed to gather the information required.
It was recognized that routes were broadly divided into those which
lay entirely inside the boundaries of a single Conference area and those
which ran between points in two or more Conference areas - in brief,
into intra-Conference and inter-Conference categories.
Since the majority of world routes break down into regional opera-
tions, with varying operating characteristics in each region, it was seen
that intra-Conference routes must be further sub-divided.
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It was decided that the costs of east-west inter-Conference routes
would be based on the costs of the round-the-world trunk routes, even
though these routes might not, in some cases, follow the exact trunk
pattern. Further, since it was evident that carriers who operate only
along one sector of the trunk routes were entitled to some voice in the
determination of trunk rates, these main routes were divided into
three sectors:
(i) North American to European gateways;
(ii) European gateways to Calcutta; and
(iii) Calcutta to the West Coast of North America.
To make cost reports consistent in all three Conference areas, dif-
ferentiation had to be made between basic factors22 and secondary
considerations in airline operating costs, and it was recognized that
there were still other considerations, which, while not entirely pre-
dictable, have an important influence on international air transport
cost figures. These include such matters as grounding of equipment,
delay in deliveries of new equipment, difficulties in obtaining spare
parts, currency fluctuations, changes in wages and commodity prices,
alterations in organizational structure, variations in anticipated avail-
able payload and other factors which had to be considered in cost
calculations.
The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Ministry of Civil Aviation
appear to be conscious guardians of the principle incorporated in the
Bermuda Agreement that rates should be reasonable. The Civil Aero-
nautics Board's Order extending its approval of the IATA Conferences
to February 28, 1950, gave detailed consideration to the rate-making
process and to the character of the economic data relied upon by the
Conference in reaching individual rate resolutions.
22 (a) The major operating factors are: the average number of aircraft, to-
tal flight hours (less non-revenue hours), net revenue flight hours, average speed,
revenue kilometres (great circle kilometres, course flown), average saleable capac-
ity for full period, saleable metric ton kilometres, flight equipment depreciation.
The overall load factor for this purpose is the quotient obtained by dividing reve-
nue ton kilometres flown by saleable ton kilometres.
(b) The elements of cost are: (1) Flying operations (crew salaries, expenses
and insurance, fuel and oil, insurance, aircraft and public liability insurance,
flight equipment rental) ; (2) Aircraft maintenance (direct labour, including la-
bour expended in aircraft engine maintenance and repair, materials and outside
repairs; overhead, including supervisory personnel and all other indirect expenses
in operation and maintenance) ; (3) Depreciation of flight equipment; (4) Station
and ground operation (landing charges, salaries, wages and expenses, other air-
port and station costs) ; (5) Passenger service (cabin attendants' salaries, ex-
penses; passenger liability insurance, meals and accommodation) ; (6) Selling and
publicity (agency commission, advertising and publicity) ; (7) Administrative and
general office charges, salaries, expenses, fees; (8) Capital charges, including
interest on debt, income taxes, amortization of development expenses and provision
for profit.
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The Council of ICAO, in accordance with the provisions of the Chi-
cago Convention 23 approved Statistical Reporting Forms, specified as
Table T.2 (Traffic Summary) and Table F.2 (Operating Summary),
and the Civil Aeronautics Board requested that the rate resolutions
reached at IATA Traffic Conferences be supported by the minimum
information provided by these forms.
It is the opinion of the Board that "neither the members of IATA
nor the reviewing agencies or their respective Governments can ade-
quately appraise the economic soundness of rate resolutions except
upon consideration of such minimum data." It might be suggested that
one of the reasons which prompted the Civil Aeronautics Board's
request to the carriers lies in the fact that many of the signatory coun-
tries to the Chicago Convention and members of ICAO had failed to
provide the information on a governmental level.
PRIMARY QUESTIONS BEFORE THE CONFERENCES
While the whole work of the IATA Traffic Conferences cannot be
fully examined in the course of this study, it will be appropriate to
touch upon the main headings with which they deal.
The most important is'sues before the Conferences are those of basic
rates and specified fares. Rates for scheduled operations are agreed
upon by resolution and are recognized as minimum, but not maximum
rates.
These agreements are further complicated by the international
character of the Traffic Conferences. Provisions relating to currency
questions - in themselves too complicated for exploration here - must
be introduced. "Conversion rates" must be established to make pos-
sible the translation of rates from the currency agreed upon in the first
instance (in Conference No. 1, the United States dollar, and in Con-
ference No. 2, the pound sterling) to the local currencies of the indi-
vidual carriers. Since international carriers do business in more than
one country, there must be provision for further recalculation of rates
into other currencies, so that exchange rates must also be agreed upon
by resolution. It has been necessary also to introduce some restrictions
based upon current complications of international exchange: for
example, non-residents of a country in which a ticket is sold must pay
their fares either:
23 Art. 67 of the Chicago Convention contains the following important under-
taking:
"Each contracting State undertakes that its international airlines shall,
in accordance with requirements laid down by the Council, file with the Coun-
cil traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements showing among
other things all receipts and the sources thereof."
According to Art. 54 of the Chicago Convention, one of the mandatory func-
tions of the Council is:
"(i) Request, collect, examine and publish information relating to. the
advancement of air navigation and the operation of international air
services, including information about the costs of operation and particu-
lars of subsidies paid to airlines from public funds."
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(a) in Portuguese escudos, Swiss francs or United States
dollars;
(b) in the currency of the country of residence of the passen-
ger (if not prohibited by law in the country of sale) ; or
(c) in the currency of the country of sale (with the exception
of passengers residing in certain countries who must
prove that the currency has been obtained at the official
rate).
The only exceptions to the rates agreed in the "Specific Fares and
Rates" resolutions are in connection with the round-trips, circle trips,
open-jaw trips, excursion fares, free and reduced rate transportation
for agents and tour conductors, privileges of stop-over, all of which are
discounts, and sleeper surcharges, which call for increase in fare.
In addition to providing for specific rates and fares between certain
points, it was foreseen that the carriers would have to establish other
rates and fares. So that these unspecified rates would not, either alone
or in combination with others, undercut the specific rates, certain
precautions were taken. It was provided that unspecified rates would
be constructed in conformity with existing Conference resolutions, that
their validity would expire with the specific rate resolutions, and that
the carrier wishing to establish such an unspecified rate must notify
the Secretary of the Traffic Conference concerned in advance of such
action.
The Conferences also agreed upon regulations for the construction
of inter-Conference rates and for the adjustment of through rates to
meet combinations of intermediate rates.
Inter-Conference rate construction is, under present resolutions,
governed by the following two principles:
(a) establishing rates between specified gateways and adding
to them the agreed Conference fares to and from such
gateways; and
(b) establishment of through fares on the basis of a distance
curve by agreement among the carriers concerned.
The carrier establishing inter-Conference rates may choose between
these two principles.
Where there is a discrepancy between the through rate between
two points and the combination of rates established for service via
intermediate points, the Conference regulations provide that the
through rate may be adjusted downward to the sum of the intermediate
rates. Should such a reduction be necessary, however, thirty days'
notice must be given to other Conference members before its intro-
duction.
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All of the arrangements so far mentioned apply to the scheduled
operations of the carriers. In charter operations, they are left free
to do as they please, with the exception of a safeguard against eventual
rate-cutting through such charter operations. It has been agreed by the
Conferences that all charter agreements must contain the stipulation
that the party to whom the space is sold will not resell it to the general
public for less than the IATA rate; that members will not undercut
Conference rates by operating charter services; and finally, that charter
prices charged by members will be calculated on a complete plane-load
basis. Governments or government-sponsored organizations are, how-
ever, exempted from these regulations in the event the charter concerns
the transportation of immigrants and displaced persons. Even in this
case, however, the charter price must be calculated on a complete
planeload basis.
In the construction of cargo rates, a distinction has been made
between low density cargo, which has bulk, but little value, and cargo
of particularly high value, which must be given special treatment.
Quantity discounts, common to all other forms of transport, were
introduced and agreed upon, as were commodity rates for high value
cargo.
These are by no means a complete catalogue of the various kinds of
rate resolutions, nor have those mentioned been fully explored. They
will, however, give some idea of the complexity of the problem and
procedures necessarily treated by the Conferences.
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF RATE AGREEMENTS
In reviewing the bilateral agreements, it was pointed out that the
respective governments reserved the right to exercise a control over
the rates the carriers sought to introduce. The mechanics of the Con-
ferences have been seriously affected by this requirement, especially
in the light of the Conference rule that no carrier is bound by a reso-
lution if its government disapproves it, or if it is against its national
policy.
The purpose of the Conference method is to achieve resolutions
which can be subscribed to by all the participating carriers and which
are effective and binding on all the members. This aim might be
seriously endangered by the facts:
(a) that there is no definite time limit set or agreed by the
governments for the expression of their approval or dis-
approval; and
(b) that, since it is quite natural that no carrier is willing to
make an agreement effective unless reasonably certain
that the others will be able to get their government's ap-
proval to do the same, a rate cannot be announced as
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effective before all governments concerned have approved
the resolution.
This serious question of the effective-date of Conference resolutions
is further complicated by the different concepts of European and
United States carriers concerning public policy.
United States carriers took the position that their government
agency cannot be limited in its action and that every agreement reached
by the Conferences could be adopted only "subject to government ap-
proval." On the contrary, the European carriers felt that such an
expression would render Conference work ineffective, as governments
may not express their opinion regarding an agreement in any reason-
able time, and they continued the practice of prescribing a date of
effectiveness of their resolutions prior to which any government might
express its approval or disapproval.
At Rio de Janeiro, where the first composite meeting of the three
Traffic Conferences was held in 1947, the opposing viewpoints were
brought into sharper focus. It was contended that practical operating
experience demonstrated that it was a most undesirable arrangement
to make agreements come into effect at an indefinite date in the future.
The only practical and realistic approach to the problem, it was argued,
was to arrange that agreements affecting the business of air transporta-
tion would come into effect at a definite date, as close to the time of
agreement as possible.
The record, of government action in- passing upon IATA resolutions
appeared not to have been satisfactory. Sometimes delay was occa-
sioned by one government and sometimes by another, but, in each
case, operators suffered the cumulative effect of such delay.
A compromise was finally reached in Rio de Janeiro, which pro-
vided that:
(1) Pure rate resolutions were to continue to be "subject to
Government approval."
(2) Mixed resolutions related to rates were to come into effect
on a specified date, allowing governments a reasonable period
of time in which to approve or disapprove the resolutions
before they became effective.
(3) Non-rate resolutions were to come into effect immediately.
This arrangement appeared only to be a partial solution and in 1948
at the Bermuda meeting of the Conferences, the question was consid-
ered again. It was agreed there to deviate from the three-fold distinc-
tion between different subjects and to adopt a uniform procedure for
determining the dates of effectiveness of all kinds of agreements.
Generally, the resolutions with respect to effective date provide that
the carriers are responsible for obtaining their governments' approval
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of agreements within a forty-five day period immediately following
December 31, 1948 (filing period) ; that, if during the filing period
the respective government neither expressed itself nor requested an
extension of the filing period, the machinery would start moving and
the announcement and effectiveness dates would be specified by the
secretaries of the Traffic Conferences. The announcement date was set
at fifteen days following the date of this notification by the Conference
secretary and it was agreed that no member would publicly announce
the arrangements made by the agreement before that time. The
effective date of the agreement is set at forty-five days after the date of
notification. There is also provision for the length of time the respec-
tive agreements are to remain effective.
There are, however, differences in the way these effectiveness reso-
lutions anticipate the disapproval of a resolution by governments. The
various treatments of this question are:
(a) certain agreements, including the one regulating the ef-
fectiveness of resolutions, were made void if disapproved
by any government authority;
(b) certain agreements, although declared to be void if
wholly or partly disapproved by a government (thus
giving rise to the same open-rate situation which would
exist if there were no resolution at all) , leave Confer-
ence members individually free to put the provision of
the agreement into effect, subject to the laws of the
countries in which they operate;
(c) one resolution is not voided by the disapproval of a
government and can be implemented by all carriers
whose governments have not disapproved, provided that
it is not applied in a country which has disapproved it;
(d) the agreement covering specific Fares and Rates received
special treatment: if any of the fares, or rates or charges
set forth (in the resolution) "is disapproved by gov-
ernment authority, the fares, rates or charges disapproved
shall be ineffective and an open situation shall exist with
respect to such fares, rates or charges."
A period of validity is set for every agreement. Some resolutions
may be effective for only a few months, while others can be valid for
longer terms, depending upon their nature and circumstances.
The Civil Aeronautics Board in Agreement CAB No. 493, made it
a condition that no resolution relating to rates for periods extending
beyond the period of approval of that agreement would be approved
by the Board. It has been also said by the Civil Aeronautics Board
that "the right of independent action of any carrier once it has
observed the Conference procedures must be "scrupulously preserved."
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RELATION BETWEEN IATA AND THE TRAFFIC CONFERENCES
The foregoing illustrates some of the problems before the Traffic
Conferences. There remains only to consider the relation between
IATA, the association, and the IATA Traffic Conferences as autono-
mous bodies.
The ties between IATA and the Conferences are these:
(1) the authority of the Conferences is derived from the General
Meeting of IATA.
(2) Membership in the Traffic Conference is contemporaneous
only with membership in IATA.
(3) The provisions for the regulation and conduct of the Confer-
ences are established by the Executive Committee of IATA
and amendments to these provisions are left to the Executive
Committee.
(4) In the case of alleged breaches of agreements by members of
the Conferences, the Director General of IATA has the power
to refer the matter to a commission, and to appoint the com-
mission from a panel established by the authority of the IATA
Executive Committee. The decision and action taken by the
Commission will be reported to the Director General. Ap-
peal against the decision of the Commission will be made to
the IATA Executive Committee.
(5) The budgets of the Traffic Conferences must have the ap-
proval of the IATA Executive Committee, and the Traffic
Conferences have no power to alter the budget after it has
been so approved without obtaining the endorsement of the
proposed alteration by the Executive Committee.
(6) The Secretaries and staff of the Traffic Conferences are em-
ployees of IATA, independent of any of the members of
IATA.
In considering the relationship between the Association and the
Conferences, it must be borne in mind that most of the problems of
international air traffic are worldwide in scope, if only for the reason
that the route structure of international air traffic is now worldwide. If
this system is to function efficiently, fares must be quoted in universally
understood terms, provision must be made for the settlement of inter-
line transactions no inatter where they are made, and the policy under
which carriers accept passengers or cargo must be coordinated through-
out the flight. In all of these matters, not only the individual Confer-
ences but many departments of the airlines which did not participate
directly in the Conference work are heavily involved. To deal with
these problems as they affect them, the Conferences need not only com-
posite meetings, but the harmonized assistance and consultation of le-
gal and financial experts of the airlines.
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While IATA, the association, has many functions independent of
the Conferences, it presents a practicable and efficient machinery for
such coordination. The authority of the Conferences is thus derived
from a body - the General Meeting of IATA - in which all members
of all Conferences are represented. The Executive Committee of
IATA, to whom amending powers over the constitution of Conferences
are granted, is confirmed in office, and subject to the policies laid down
by the General Meeting.
The limitation upon the power to amend the basic laws of social
organisms is a well established principle of constitutional law. Its pur-
pose is to make sure that the primary rules of the organization cannot
be altered to suit purely political and transitory ends, and the provision
that the Executive Committee of IATA must approve alterations to
regulations of the Conferences constitutes this sort of safeguard.
The provision that membership in the Conferences is contempora-
neous with membership in IATA is an expression of this duality: it is
hardly conceivable that an airline would wish to participate in a Con-
ference administered by a body in whose policies it did not have a voice.
It should be borne in mind at the same time that membership in
IATA and in the Conferences is not exclusive. The doors of both are
open to all carriers, subject only to the requirement that they must be
air transport enterprises operating a scheduled air service under proper
authority in the transport of passengers, mail or cargo for public hire
between the territories of two or more states and that they must have
that authority from a state eligible for membership in the International
Civil Aviation Organization. In brief, it is the state which determines
the eligibility of an airline to membership in IATA and the Confer-
ences.
The procedures established for the settlement of alleged breaches are
an attempt to take arbitral matters at least one step out of the cockpit of
Conference routine. The commission which is provided to look into
such allegations is named by the Director General of IATA, not neces-
sarily as an official of the Association, but as an impartial person having
no relation to the parties. The authority of the Executive Committee
to act as final tribunal creates only such relationship as the authority of
any other arbitral tribunal would and extends no control over the Con-
ferences to this Committee.
The provisions for centralized preparation of the budget and the
personnel of the Conferences are precautions to assure the absolute
impartiality- of the Conference administration, who call the meetings,
prepare the agenda and Write the minutes.
The autonomy of the Conferences vis a vis IATA is positively as-
sured by certain measures which give them the full control of their
meetings and their agenda:
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(i) one-third of the voting members of a Conference have the
right to request the Secretary to call a meeting;
(ii) no matters can be placed upon the agenda of a Conference
unless they have been notified to all members thirty days in
advance of the meeting, and business which is not so notified
in advance can be acted upon only by unanimous consent of
all Conference members.
Finally, whatever administrative functions in connection with the
Conferences may be assigned to the Executive Committee, the Director
General of IATA, or the Conference Secretaries, they have neither di-
rect control over the meetings, nor the right to vote upon resolutions.
CONCLUSION
From a consideration of the Conferences, of their rules, procedures
and activities, these salient features stand forth:
(i) they provide the utmost precautions against possible trust
activities by the carriers because each carrier has full right to
participate and express his views and to cast one vote; because
any carrier may veto any agreement which is against its inter-
est (and thereby prevent other carriers from entering into it) ;
and because carriers may be bound only by actions taken in
meeting and in the form of a resolution, no outside compacts
or agreements in minutes being binding;
(ii) they assure effective compliance with national laws, regula-
tions and controls. Every government may disapprove a rate
detrimental to the interests of its own citizens, thereby void-
ing wholly or in part the Conference resolutions concerned,
and no carrier may be bound by an agreement which would
require it to contravene the laws of its own state;
(iii) they offer definite guarantees against discrimination, in that
qualification for membership is not left to carriers already
members of the Conferences, but to governments;
(iv) they are committed to the principle laid down in the Ber-
muda Agreement and reiterated in the subsequent Anglo-
American declaration, and incorporated in the bilateral
agreements - to endeavor to give the public cheaper transport
rates by bringing their charges into relationship with costs.
This discussion of the rules and procedures of the Traffic Confer-
ences of the airlines has concentrated on the operation of their rate-
making machinery because of the express references to them in the
many bilateral agreements.
Because of the many issues involved in these agreements, it is diffi-
cult to draw hard and fast conclusions regarding them. Nevertheless it
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is submitted that, insofar as rates are concerned, the bilateral air trans-
port agreements have established a uniform framework for making rea-
sonable rates, have set up within it a system of more or less universally
recognized Traffic Conference machinery by which carriers can agree
upon rates, have given governments the right to control carriers' rate
agreements in the public interest, and have, in most cases, provided for
arbitration of disputes.
Undoubtedly, there will always be divergencies and difficulties in
the rate-making field. The present system, however, provides a means
whereby these can be reconciled and resolved within the operators'
Conferences and without the constant danger of resort to expensive and
destructive rate wars.
It is interesting to note that, while the present structure was created
almost incidentally by the Bermuda Agreement in 1946, it has been so
reinforced by subsequent bilateral agreements that it represents today a
worldwide network in which great confidence has been placed by all
parties concerned. The present machinery can be improved, and
undoubtedly will be as time goes on. Yet, as it stands, it offers a guar-
antee that the carrier will not be forced into uneconomic operation and
that the public will not be exploited.
